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When are three voters enough for privacy properties?
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Abstract. Protocols for secure electronic voting are of increasing societal im-
portance. Proving rigorously their security is more challenging than many other
protocols, which aim at authentication or key exchange. One of the reasons is that
they need to be secure for an arbitrary number of malicious voters. In this paper
we identify a class of voting protocols for which only a small number of agents
needs to be considered: if there is an attack on vote privacy then there is also an
attack that involves at most 3 voters (2 honest voters and 1 dishonest voter).
In the case where the protocol allows a voter to cast several votes and counts, e.g.,
only the last one, we also reduce the number of ballots required for an attack to
10, and under some additional hypotheses, 7 ballots. Our results are formalised
and proven in a symbolic model based on the applied pi calculus. We illustrate the
applicability of our results on several case studies, including different versions of
Helios and Preˆt-a`-Voter, as well as the JCJ protocol. For some of these protocols
we can use the ProVerif tool to provide the first formal proofs of privacy for an
unbounded number of voters.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting has been adopted in several countries, such as the United States, Es-
tonia, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and France, to conduct legally binding elections
(or at least trials for some of them). Electronic voting systems should ensure the same
properties than the traditional paper ballots systems, despite the fact that malicious users
may easily intercept ballots and try to forge fake ones. One crucial property is vote pri-
vacy: no one should know how a particular voter voted. Symbolic models have been
very successful in the analysis of more traditional protocols that aim at confidential-
ity or authentication. Many decision techniques and several tools have been developed
(see [1,2,3] to cite only a few) which have been successfully applied to a large number
of case studies including widely deployed protocols such as TLS [4]. Vote privacy in
symbolic models can be expressed through a rather simple and natural property [5]: an
attacker should not be able to distinguish the situation where Alice votes 0 and Bob
votes 1 from the situation where the votes are swapped:
VAlice(0) | VBob(1) ≈ VAlice(1) | VBob(0)
Despite its apparent simplicity, this property is difficult to check for several reasons.
Firstly, most existing decision techniques apply to reachability properties (such as au-
thentication and confidentiality) but not to indistinguishability properties. Another ma-
jor difficulty comes from the fact that e-voting systems involve less standard cryp-
tographic primitives and sometimes even specially designed, ad-hoc primitives (like
for the protocol used in Norway [6]). Typical primitives in e-voting are homomorphic
encryption, zero-knowledge proofs, reencryption mixnets, etc. Some techniques and
tools [7, 8, 9, 10] for indistinguishability properties have recently been developed to au-
tomatically check indistinguishability properties and some of them can handle part of
the primitives needed in e-voting. For example, ProVerif and Akiss have both been suc-
cessfully applied to analyse some voting protocols [5, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. However, a
third source of difficulty is the fact that voting systems are typically parametrized by
the number of voters: both the bulletin board and the tally processes have to process
as many ballots as they receive. This is typically modeled by considering processes
parametrized by the number of voters. Even though parameterized protocols can be
encoded in a formalism such as the applied pi calculus, such encodings are compli-
cated and generally beyond the capabilities of what automated tools support. ProVerif,
which to the best of our knowledge is the only tool that supports verification of indistin-
guishability properties for an unbounded number of sessions (i.e. allowing replication)
generally fails to prove vote privacy. One exception is a case study of the Civitas vot-
ing system by Backes et al. [11] using ProVerif. The other tools for indistinguishability
(e.g. SPEC [8], Akiss [10], and APTE [9]) can only handle a finite number of sessions.
So case studies have to consider a finite number of voters [10, 12, 13, 14] unless proofs
are conducted by hand [13, 15].
Contributions. Our main contribution is a reduction result for a reasonnably large class
of voting protocols. If there is an attack on privacy for n voters, we show that there
also exists one that only requires 3 voters: 2 honest voters are necessary to state the
privacy property and then 1 dishonest is sufficient to find all existing attacks. This result
significantly simplifies security proofs: there is no longer need to consider arbitrarily
many voters, even in manual proofs. Moreover, this result allows the use of automated
tools for checking equivalence properties and justifies previous proofs conducted for a
fixed number of voters (provided at least one dishonest voter was considered).
Several protocols assume voters may revote several times. This is for example the
case of Helios or Civitas. Revoting is actually crucial for coercion-resistance in Civitas.
When revoting is allowed, this should be reflected in the model by letting the ballot box
accept an unbounded number of ballots, and retaining only the valid ones according
to the revote policy. This aspect is typically abstracted in any existing formal analysis.
We show that we can simplify the analysis by reducing the total number of ballots
to 10 for typical revoting policies (e.g. the last vote counts) and typical tally functions.
Altogether, our result amounts in a finite model property: if there is an attack on privacy
on n voters that may vote arbitrarily, then there is an attack that only requires 3 voters
and at most 10 ballots. We can further reduce the number of ballots to 7 for a class of
protocols that has identifiable ballots, that is ballots that reveal the corresponding public
credentials. Of course, only 3 ballots are sufficient when revoting is disallowed.
Our result holds in a rather general setting provided that the e-voting system can
be modeled as a process in the applied-pi calculus [16]. Of course, this reduction result
cannot hold for arbitrary systems. For example, if the tally phase checks that at least
4 ballots are present then at least 4 voters are necessary to conduct an attack. So we
model what we think to represent a “reasonable” class of e-voting systems. The process
modeling the voter may be an arbitrary process as long as it does not depend on cre-
dentials of other voters and provided voters do not need to interact once the tally phase
has started. This corresponds to the “vote and go” property, that is often desirable for
practical reasons, but also excludes some protocols such as [17]. Once the vote is casted
the authorities proceed as follows.
– The bulletin board (if there is one) performs only public actions such as publish-
ing a received ballot, possibly removing some parts and possibly after some public
tests, i.e. tests that anyone could do as well. Typical public tests are checks of signa-
ture validity, well-formedness of the ballots, or validity of zero-knowledge proofs.
Alternatively, we may consider an arbitrary bulletin board in case it is corrupted
since it is then part of the adversarial environment.
– Next, a revote policy is applied. We consider two particular revote policies: the
policy which selects the last ballot, which is the most common one, and the policy
that selects the first one, which encodes the situation where revoting is prohibited.
– Finally, the tally is computed according to some counting function. We consider
in particular two very common functions: the multiset and the additive counting
functions. The multiset counting function returns the votes in an arbitrary order
and corresponds for example to the output of a decryption mixnet. The additive
counting function returns the number of votes received by each candidate.
We believe that these conditions are general enough to capture many existing e-
voting schemes.
Applications. To illustrate the applicability of our result, we re-investigate several ex-
isting analyses of e-voting protocols. First, we consider several versions of the Helios
protocol [18], both in its mixnet and homomorphic versions. These versions also in-
clude the Belenios [19] protocol. We are able to use the ProVerif tool to show privacy
for the mixnet versions of these protocols for a bounded number of voters and ballots.
Our reduction result allows immediately to conclude that vote privacy also holds for
an arbitrary number of voters. The homomorphic version of Helios is out of reach of
existing tools due to the presence of associative and commutative symbols. However,
our reduction result does apply, which means that the manual proof of Helios conducted
in [13] did not need to consider arbitrarily many voters and could be simplified. In case
one wishes to adapt this proof to Belenios [19], our reduction result would alleviate
the proof. The Preˆt-a`-Voter [20] protocol (PaV) has been analysed using ProVerif for 2
honest voters [12]. Adding a third, dishonest, voter, we can apply our result and obtain
the first proof of vote privacy for an arbitrary number of voters. Unfortunately, ProVerif
did not scale up to verify automatically the protocol in presence of a dishonest voter. We
were also able to apply our result (and a proof using ProVerif) to a protocol by Moran
and Naor and to the JCJ protocol implemented in Civitas (without a ProVerif proof).
Related work. To our knowledge, the only other reduction result applying to voting pro-
tocols was proposed by Dreier et al. [21]. Their result states that it is sufficient to prove
vote privacy for two honest voters when the protocol is observationally equivalent to a
protocol consisting of the parallel composition (not sharing any secret) of a partition of
the set of voters. Applicability has however only been shown to examples where this
trivially holds, e.g. [17, 22] as these protocols use completely public tallying mecha-
nisms. In general, proving the required equivalence does not seem easier than proving
directly vote secrecy. Moreover, it does not apply to some well known protocols such
as Helios since a dishonest voter is needed to mount the vote replay attack [13].
The results of [23,24] show how to reduce the number of agents, in the case of trace
properties [23] and equivalence properties [24]. The major difference with our work is
that [23,24] simply reduce the number of agent identities while the number of sessions
(or processes) remains the same. In contrast, we do not only reduce the number of voter
identities but also the number of ballots the ballot box needs to process, yielding a
simpler process.
2 Modelling security protocols
As usual in symbolic protocol analysis we model protocol messages as terms. Protocols
are modelled in a process calculus, similar to the applied pi calculus [16].
2.1 Messages
We assume an infinite set of names N = {a, b, k, n, . . .} (which are used to represent
keys, nonces, . . . ) and an infinite set of channels Ch = {c, c1, ch, ch1, . . .} (which
are used to represent communication channels). We also consider a set of variables
X = {x, y, . . .}, and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols.
Terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other terms.
In particular, a channel is not a term. Let N ⊆ N and X ⊆ X , the set of terms built
from N and X by applying function symbols in Σ is denoted by T (Σ,N∪X). We write
fv(t) (resp. fn(t)) for the set of variables (resp. names) occurring in a term t. A term is
ground if it does not contain any variable.
Example 1. We model asymmetric encryption, signatures, and pairs by the signature
Σaenc
def
= {aenc/3, adec/2, pk/1, sig/2, checksig/2, getmsg/1, vk/1, 〈·, ·〉/2, pi1/1, pi2/1}
where f/i denotes that f has arity i. Consider term t def= 〈pk(sk), aenc(pk(sk), r,m)〉
where sk, r,m ∈ N . The term t represents a pair consisting of the public key pk(sk) as-
sociated to the private key sk and the encryption of message m with public key pk(sk)
using randomness r. To improve readability, we may sometimes write 〈t1, . . . , tn〉 in-
stead of 〈t1, 〈. . . 〈tn−1, tn〉 . . .〉〉.
We denote by ` = [t1, . . . , tn] the list of terms t1, . . . , tn and by t0 :: ` the list
obtained by adding the term t0 to the head of the list, i.e., t0 :: ` = [t0, t1, . . . , tn].
Sometimes we interpret lists as multisets and we write `1 =# `2 for the equality of the
multisets corresponding to these lists.
A substitution is a partial function from variables to terms. The substitution σ that
maps xi to ti (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is denoted {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn} and we write
dom(σ) = {x1, . . . , xn} for the domain of σ. We denote by ∅ the substitution whose
domain is empty. We always suppose that substitutions are acyclic. As usual we extend
substitutions to terms and write tσ for the application of σ to term t.
To model algebraic properties of cryptographic primitives, we define an equational
theory by a finite set E of equations u = v with u, v ∈ T (Σ,X ). We define =E to
be the smallest equivalence relation on terms, that contains E and that is closed under
application of function symbols and substitutions of terms for variables.
Example 2. Continuing Example 1 we define the equational theory Eaenc by the follow-
ing equations.
adec(xk, aenc(pk(xk), xr, xm)) = xm checksig(sig(x, y), vk(y)) = ok
pii(〈x1, x2〉) = xi (i ∈ {1, 2}) getmsg(sig(x, y)) = x
Then we have that adec(sk, pi2(t)) =Eaenc m.
To illustrate our calculus we consider the Helios e-voting protocol as running ex-
ample. The Helios protocol relies on zero knowledge proofs. We next specify the equa-
tional theory for the particular zero knowledge proofs built by the Helios participants.
Example 3. The Helios zero knowledge proofs can be modelled by the signature
Σzkp
def
= {zkpE/3, checkzkpE/2, okzkpE/0} ∪ {zkpmDM/3, checkzkpmDM/3, okzkpmDM/0}m∈N
In case of homomorphic tally, the voters should also prove that their vote is valid,
which can be modeled in a similar way. When submitting an encrypted vote, voters are
required to prove that the encryption is well-formed, that is to say, that they know the
corresponding plaintext and randomness. This is reflected by the following equation.
checkzkpE(zkpE(xr, xv, aenc(xpk, xr, xv)), aenc(xpk, xr, xv)) = okzkpE.
In the decryption mixnets-based variant of the Helios protocol, the talliers output a zero
knowledge proof of correct mix and decryption. Such a proof establishes that the output
of the decryption mixnet is indeed a permutation of the content of the encrypted ballots
received as input. This is captured by the following infinite set of equations. For all
m ∈ N, and all {i1, . . . , im} = {1, . . . ,m},
checkzkpmDM(zkp
m
DM(xk, xciph, xplain), xciph, xplain) = okzkp
m
DM
with xciph = (aenc(pub(xk), xr1, xv1), . . . , aenc(pub(xk), xrm, xvm)) and xplain =
(xvi1 , . . . , xvim).
In all the examples of this section, we will consider the signature Σ = Σaenc ∪Σzkp
and the equational theory E = Eaenc ∪ Ezkp.
We say that a symbol + is associative and commutative (AC in short) w.r.t. an
equational theory E if E contains the two equations:
x+ y = y + x x+ (y + z) = (x+ y) + z
2.2 Processes
We model protocols using a process calculus. Our plain processes are similar to plain
processes in applied pi calculus [16] and are defined through the grammar given in
Figure 1 where c is a channel, t, t1, t2 are terms, x is a variable, n is either a name or a
channel, and i ∈ N is an integer. The terms t, t1, t2 may contain variables.
The process 0 does nothing. P | Q behaves as the parallel execution of processes P
andQ. νn.P restricts the scope of n. When n is a name, it typically represents a freshly
P,Q := 0
P | Q
νn.P
!P
if t1 = t2 then P else Q
c(x).P
c〈t〉.Q
i : P
Fig. 1. Syntax of plain processes
generated, secret value, e.g., a key or a nonce,
in P . When n is a channel, it declares a private
channel, that cannot be accessed by the adversary.
Replication !P behaves as an unbounded num-
ber of copies of P . The conditional if t1 =
t2 then P else Q behaves as P if t1 and t2 are
equal in the equational theory and asQ otherwise.
The process c(x).P inputs a message t on chan-
nel c, binds it to x and then behaves as P where x
has been replaced by t. c〈t〉.Q outputs message
t on channel c before behaving as Q. Our cal-
culus also introduces a phase instruction, in the
spirit of [24, 25], denoted i : P . We denote by
Phase(P ) the set of phases that appears in P , that
is the set of j such that j : Q occurs in P . By a
slight abuse of notations, we write Phase(P ) < Phase(Q) if any phase in Phase(P )
is smaller than any phase in Phase(Q).
As usual, names and variables have scopes, which are delimited by restrictions and
inputs. We write fv(P ), bv(P ), fn(P ) and bn(P ) for the sets of free and bound vari-
ables, and free and bound names of a plain process P respectively.
Example 4. A voter in Helios proceeds as follows. She computes her ballot by encrypt-
ing her vote with the public key pk(skE) of the election. The corresponding secret
key is shared among several election authorities, which is not modeled here. Then she
casts her ballot together with her identity and a zero knowledge proof through an au-
thenticated channel. All this information will be published on a public bulletin board.
The process V (pk(skE), cred, id, v) models the actions of a voter with identity id and
credential cred casting a ballot for candidate v:
V (pk(skE), cred, id, v)
def
= νr. bb〈〈id, sig(bal, cred), prf 〉〉
where bal = aenc(pk(skE), r, v) and prf = zkpE(r, v, bal). The authenticated channel
is modelled by a signature although Helios relies on a login/password mechanism.
Extended processes keep track of additional information during an execution: the
names that have been bound, the currently active processes that are running in parallel,
the history of messages that were output by the process and the current phase.
Definition 1 (Extended process). An extended process is a tuple (E ;P;Φ; i) where:
– E is a set of names and channels that are restricted in P and Φ;
– P is a multiset of plain processes with fv(P) = ∅;
– Φ = {x1 7→ u1, . . . , xn 7→ un} is a ground substitution where u1, . . . , un repre-
sent the messages previously output to the environment.
– i is an integer denoting the current phase.
Example 5. The following extended process models two honest Helios voters idA and
idB ready to cast their ballots vA and vB respectively in a first phase, and the Helios
tallying authorities Tal ready to tally the cast ballots in a second phase
Helios(vA, vB)
def
= (E0, 1 : VA | 1 : VB | 2 : Tal, ∅, 1)
where E0 is a set of names with credA, credB ∈ E0,
VA
def
= V (pk(skE), credA, idA, vA) and VB
def
= V (pk(skE), credB , idB , vB)
model the two honest voters where V is defined in Example 4, and
Tal
def
= bb(xbA).bb(xbB).T
for some process T modelling the tallying authorities.
Given A = (E ;P;Φ; i), we define the set of free and bound names of A as fn(A) =
(fn(P)∪ fn(Φ))r E , and bn(A) = bn(P)∪ E . Similarly free and bound variables are
defined as fv(A) = (fv(P) ∪ dom(Φ)), and bv(A) = bv(P). An extended process A
is closed if fv(A) = dom(Φ).
The operational semantics of our calculus is defined by a labelled transition system
which allows to reason about processes that interact with their environment. The transi-
tion relation A `−→ B relates two ground extended processes A and B and is decorated
by a label `, which is either an input (c(M)), an output (νx.c〈x〉), or a silent action (τ ).
Silent actions are standard, while visible input and output actions are interactions with
the adversary on public channels. An output label νx.c〈x〉 reflects that messages are
output “by reference”: the label contains the variable added to dom(Φ) which maps to
the ground message that was output. The input label c(M) contains the term M used
by the adversary to compute the message:M may be constructed from previous outputs
(adressed through variables in dom(Φ)), but is not allowed to use private names. The
transition relation is formally defined in the companion technical report [26].
Notations. Given a set S we denote by S∗ the set of all finite sequences of elements
in S. We may also write u˜ for the finite sequence u1, . . . , un. Let A be the alphabet
of actions (in our case this alphabet is infinite and contains the special symbol τ ). For
every w ∈ A∗, the relation w−→ on processes is defined in the usual way, i.e., we write
A
w−→ A′ when w = `1`2 · · · `n and A `1−→ A1 `2−→ . . . `n−→ A′. For s ∈ (Ar {τ})∗, the
relation s=⇒ on processes is defined by: A s=⇒ B if, and only if there exists w ∈ A∗ such
that A w−→ B and s is obtained by erasing all occurrences of τ from w.
Example 6. Continuing our running example we illustrate the operational semantics by
the following transitions
Helios(vA, vB)
νyA.bb〈yA〉
=======⇒ νyB .bb〈yB〉=======⇒ phase 2====⇒ (E ;T ;Φ; 2) where
– E = E0 ∪ {rA, rB},
– Φ = {yA 7→ 〈idA, sig(balA, credA), prfA〉, yB 7→ 〈idB , sig(balB , credB), prfB 〉}
where balC = aenc(pk(skE), rC , vC) and prf C = zkpE(rC , vC , balC) for C ∈
{A,B}.
A frame ϕ = νE .Φ consists of a set of names E and a substitution Φ = {x1 7→
u1, . . . , xn 7→ un}. The names E are bound in ϕ and can be α-converted. Moreover
names can be added (or removed) to (from) E as long as they do not appear in Φ. We
writeϕ =α ϕ′ when framesϕ andϕ′ are equal up to α-conversion and addition/removal
of unused names. In this way two frames can always be rewritten to have the same set of
bound names. When A = (E ;P;Φ; i) is an extended process, we define φ(A) def= νE .Φ.
Given a frame ϕ = νE .Φ an attacker can construct new terms building on the terms
exposed by ϕ. For this the attacker applies a recipe on the frame. A recipeR for a frame
ϕ is any term such that fn(R) ∩ E = ∅ and fv(R) ⊆ dom(Φ). An attacker is unable to
distinguish two sequences of messages if he cannot construct a test that distinguishes
them. This notion is formally captured by static equivalence [16] of frames.
Definition 2 (Static equivalence). Two frames ϕ1 =α νE .Φ1 and ϕ2 =α νE .Φ2 are
statically equivalent, noted ϕ1 ∼ ϕ2 when dom(Φ1) = dom(Φ2), and for all recipes
M and N of ϕ1 we have that MΦ1 =E NΦ1 iff MΦ2 =E NΦ2.
Note that in the above definition the frames ϕ1 and ϕ2 have the same set of recipes as
they bind the same names E and their substitutions have the same domain.
Example 7. Let Φ be the substitution of Example 6 and
Φ′ = {yA 7→ 〈idA, sig(bal′A, credA), prf ′A〉, yB 7→ 〈idB , sig(bal′B , credB), prf ′B 〉}
where bal′C = aenc(pk(skE), rC , vD) and prf
′
C = zkpE(rC , vD, bal
′
C) for C,D ∈
{A,B} with C 6= D. Since adec(skE, pi1(pi1(getmsg(yA))))Φ =E vA, but adec(skE,
pi1(pi1(getmsg(yA))))Φ
′ 6=E vA, we have that
νskE.νrA.νrB .Φ ∼E νskE.νrA.νrB .Φ′ while νrA.νrB .Φ 6∼E νrA.νrB .Φ′
Indeed, an attacker may distinguish between these two frames as soon as he has the
secret key skE, by simply decrypting the ballots.
Given two extended processes A1 and A2, we often write A1 ∼ A2 for φ(A1) ∼
φ(A2). Given an extended process A we define its set of traces as
traces(A)
def
= {(tr, B) | A tr=⇒ B}
We can now define what it means for an attacker to be unable to distinguish two
processes even if he is allowed to actively interact with them. This notion of indistin-
guishability is naturally modelled by trace equivalence.
Definition 3 (Trace equivalence). Let A and B be two closed extended processes. A
is trace included in B, written A v B, if for every trace (tr, A′) ∈ traces(A) there
exists B′ such that (tr, B′) ∈ traces(B) and A′ ∼ B′. A and B are trace equivalent,
denoted A ≈ B, if A v B and B v A.
Intuitively, as the sequence of visible actions in the labels encode the adversary’s
actions the definition requires that for the same interaction with the adversary the pro-
tocols produce indistinguishable outputs.
3 Modelling e-voting protocols
In this section we explain how we formally model e-voting protocols and state the
assumptions needed for our results.
Since many e-voting protocols use zero-knowledge proofs, we consider a signature
Σ with zkp, checkzkp, okzkp ∈ Σ and we assume an equational theory that can be
described by an AC-convergent (possibly infinite) rewrite theory such that the only
rules in which zkp, checkzkp, and okzkp occur, are of the form:
checkzkp(zkp(U1, . . . , Um), V1, . . . , Vn)→ okzkp
where zkp, checkzkp, okzkp do not occur in the Ui, Vj . Since the terms Ui, Vj are left
unspecified, this captures most existing zero-knowledge proofs. In particular, it covers
the zero-knowledge proofs considered in Example 3.
A voting protocol is a family of processes {Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)}nh,nd,m∈N
where
– nh and nd are the number of honest and dishonest voters respectively;
– Crhnh (resp. Crdnd ) is the set of nh (resp. nd) voting credentials which determines
the set of honest eligible voters (resp. dishonest eligible voters), such that Crhnh ∩
Crdnd = ∅. Each credential c˜r ∈ Crhnh ∪ Crdnd is a sequence of terms;
– m is the number of ballots accepted during the tally;
– Kpv (resp. Kpb) is the set of all private (resp. public) material.
As usual it is sufficient to consider voting processes that model only the honest
voters and the tally (the dishonest voters are left unspecified as part of the environment,
and their credentials are public). We may assume w.l.o.g. that the tally process starts
with a fresh phase and first reads the ballots on the board. Formally, we assume that
voting processes are of the form:
Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)
def
= V ( ˜cr1) | V ( ˜cr2) | · · · | V ( ˜crnh) |
tall : bb(x1). . . . .bb(xm).T
n,m(Crn,Kpv,Kpb)
where Crn = Crhnh ∪ Crdnd , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , nh}, c˜ri ∈ Crhnh . Furthermore, we
require that Phase(V ) < tall, Phase(Tn,m) = ∅ and Tn,m(Crn,Kpv,Kpb) contains at
most one output which is performed on the channel tal. We note that from the above
structure of a voting process it follows that all traces are prefixes of traces of the form
tr′·phase tall·bb(RB1). . .bb(RBm)·νy.tal〈y〉.
V (c˜r) models an honest voter, whose credentials are c˜r. Tn,m(Crn,Kpv,Kpb) is the
remainder of the tallier process. It is parameterised by the numberm of ballots it accepts
and the number n of eligible voters. We require that V (c˜r) be independent of n and m
and does not use any other credentials, i.e. fn(V (c˜r))∩Crn ⊆ {c˜r}. These are the only
restrictions on the voter process and we believe them to be reasonable and natural.
An e-voting protocol proceeds in two phases: vote casting and tallying. During the
vote phase all voters simply cast their ballots. The tally phase proceeds as follows. First
m ballots are input. Then a public test is applied to these ballots to carry out a first
validity check, e.g. verify some zero knowledge proofs ensuring that the ballots are
well formed. Next, the revote policy is applied to remove votes cast by a same voter,
e.g., keep only the last one. Finally, the process performs the tally and outputs the result.
3.1 Public tests
As explained above, the ballot box may apply public tests to the casted ballots. Pub-
lic tests are Boolean combinations over atomic formulas of the form M = N where
M,N ∈ T (Σ,X), i.e. they do not contain any names. An atomic formula is satisfied
when M =E N and we lift satisfaction to tests as expected.
We assume a family of tests {Testm}m∈N where m is the number of casted ballots
that are tested and Testm contains m distinguished variables x1, . . . , xm to be substi-
tuted by the ballots. We write Testm([B1, . . . , Bm]) = > when the test Testm{x1 7→
B1, . . . , xm 7→ Bm} is satisfied. Finally we say that a test is voting-friendly when-
ever satisfaction is preserved on sublists of ballots, that is Testm([B1, . . . , Bm]) = >
implies Testh([Bi1 , . . . , Bih ]) = > for any 1 ≤ i1 < · · · < ih ≤ m.
We believe this condition to be natural. It discards contrived tests that would accept
a ballot only if another ballot is present. Conversely, we may consider tests that discard
lists with duplicate ballots.
Example 8. The public test applied by the tallying authorities in the Helios protocol
consists of two parts. First, a local test that checks the zero knowledge proofs of each
submitted ballot, and second, a global test that checks that encrypted votes are pairwise
distinct. This is to avoid the replay attack mentioned in [13]. Such checks are formally
reflected by the family of tests {Testm}m∈N with
Testm([B1, . . . , Bm])
def
=
∧i=m
i=1 lTest(Bi)
∧i6=j
i,j∈{1,...,m} gTest(Bi, Bj)
lTest(B)
def
=
{> if B = 〈id, bal, prf 〉 and checkzkpE(getmsg(bal), prf ) =E okzkpE
⊥ otherwise
gTest(B,B′) def=
> if B = 〈id, bal, prf 〉 and B
′ = 〈id′, bal′, prf ′〉
and getmsg(bal) 6= getmsg(bal′)
⊥ otherwise
3.2 Revote policies
Many e-voting protocols offer voters the possibility to cast several votes, keeping even-
tually only one vote per voter, e.g. the last submitted ballot. Which vote is kept depends
on the particular policy. Re-voting intends to guarantee some protection against coer-
cion. We formalize the notion of policy as a function Policyn,m which takes a list of
m terms (intuitively, the vote and credential) and a set of n credentials (honest and dis-
honest) and returns the sublist of selected terms to be tallied. A protocol will depend on
a family of such policy functions {Policyn,m}n,m∈N. We consider two particular, but
standard revote policies. The most usual one selects the last cast vote:
Policyn,mlast ([V1, . . . , Vm], Crn)
def
= [Vi1 , . . . , Vik ]
where each Vij = (v, c˜r) is the last occurence of the credential c˜r ∈ Crn in the list
[V1, . . . , Vm]. We also consider the policy which only keeps the first vote of each voter:
Policyn,mfirst ([V1, . . . , Vm], Crn)
def
= [Vi1 , . . . , Vik ]
where each Vij = (v, c˜r) is the first occurence of the credential c˜r ∈ Crn in the list
[V1, . . . , Vm]. Such a policy typically models the norevote policy (a voter cannot revote).
3.3 Extracting ballots and counting votes
A voting protocol should tally the ballots “as expected”. Formally, what is expected can
be formalized through an extract and a counting function.
Given a ballot B, and two sets of terms Kpb and Kpv representing the public and
private material, the extraction function Extract returns the corresponding vote and cre-
dential, or ⊥ when a ballot is not well formed., i.e., Extract(B,Kpv,Kpb) ∈ (V ×
Crn)∪ {⊥}. Moreover, we lift the extract function to lists of m ballots by applying the
function pointwise, i.e., Extractm([B1, . . . , Bm],Kpv,Kpb) def=
[Extract(B1,Kpv,Kpb), . . . ,Extract(Bm,Kpv,Kpb)]
Similar extract functions have been introduced in [27] to define ballot privacy.
Example 9. The Extract function for the Helios protocol decrypts the encrypted vote
and associates it with the signature associated to the ballot:
Extract(B, {skE}, {pk(skE)}) def={
(v, (id, cred)) if B = 〈id, bal, prf 〉 and bal =E sig(aenc(pk(skE), r, v), cred)
⊥ otherwise
Similarly the counting function defines how the protocol is supposed to tally the
votes. The function Count` takes as input a list of ` pairs (v, cr) ∈ V × Cr and returns
a list of terms as the election result.
Definition 4. Let {Count`}`∈N be a family of counting functions. {Count`}`∈N is voting-
friendly if for all m,n and lists of terms W1 of size m, W2 of size n we have that
1. if W1 =# W2 then Count
m(W1) =
# Countn(W2);
2. if Countm(W1) =# Count
n(W2)
then Countm+1((v1, cr1) ::W1) =# Count
n+1((v2, cr2) ::W2) iff v1 = v2
The first assumption requires that the result does not depend on the order in which
votes are provided (intuitively, only valid votes are kept at this stage). We believe this
property to be natural and it excludes contrived counting functions that would, e.g., only
keep votes at even positions. The second assumption states that we may count “step by
step”. This is more restrictive since it excludes the majority function, i.e., the function
that only outputs the name of the candidate that received most votes. But, it captures the
most common result functions, namely the multiset and the additive counting functions.
Example 10. The multiset counting function typically arises in mixnet based tallies,
which simply output the list of votes (intuitively once votes have been shuffled).
Count1Mix([V1])
def
= [v] and CountmMix([V1, . . . , Vm])
def
= v :: Countm−1Mix ([V2, . . . , Vm])
where V1 = (v, c˜r) andm > 1. The additive counting function can be defined similarly.
For simplicity consider a binary vote, where we just want to count the number of 1’s:
Count1HE([V1])
def
= v and CountmHE([V1, . . . , Vm])
def
= v + Countm−1HE ([V2, . . . , Vm])
where V1 = (v, c˜r), m > 1 and + is an AC symbol. Both functions are voting-friendly.
3.4 Properties
When verifying security properties of e-voting protocols it is common to only consider
processes whose runs satisfy a particular property. For instance, vote secrecy is typically
expressed as the indistinguishability of two processes modelling the situations where
two honest voters swap their votes. We need however to ensure that these two honest
voters have indeed cast their votes successfully to avoid trivial attacks. Indeed, in a run
where the attacker blocks one of these voters, but not the other, the election result will
be different and the two processes would be distinguished. Therefore when checking
vote secrecy one typically adds a check that guarantees that the two honest votes are
counted. We simply require that a check check([b1, . . . , bm]) applied to a list ballots
[b1, . . . , bm] satisfies the two following requirements:
– If check([b1, . . . , bm]) holds then we can identify two (intuitively honest) ballots
bi1 , bi2 such that check holds for any sublist containing bi1 and bi2 .
– If check([b1, . . . , bm]) does not hold then it does not hold either for any sublist of
these ballots or if some ballots are replaced by invalid ones (that is replaced by ⊥).
How such a check is implemented is left unspecified, it could be by listening to private
channels, successively checking signatures, etc.
3.5 E-voting processes
As often when considering trace equivalence (e.g. [10, 24]), we assume processes to
be deterministic. More precisely, we require the vote phase to be determinate: if the
same sequence of labels leads to two different processes then the two resulting frames
have to be statically equivalent. This typically holds for standard voting processes since
the voter’s behaviour is deterministic. For the tallying phase we slightly relax this no-
tion and require what we call almost determinate. This relaxed notion only requires
that there exists an output of a tally (among all possible outputs, as the particular tally
may be chosen non-deterministically) that ensures static equivalence. This allows us to
capture some non-deterministic behaviors such as mixnet tally.
Definition 5. An e-voting protocol {Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)}nh,nd,m∈N is al-
most determinate if for any set of names E0, any initial attacker knowledge Φ0, any
m,nh, nd ∈ N, and any traces (tr, A1), (tr, A2) ∈ traces(E0, Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb), Φ0, 0) we have that
∀A′1. A1
νx.tal〈x〉
=====⇒ A′1 ⇒ ∃A′2. A2
νx.tal〈x〉
=====⇒ A′2 and A′1 ∼ A′2
We can now put all the pieces together and link e-voting protocols to the notions of
public tests, revote policies, extraction and counting functions and properties.
Definition 6. An e-voting protocol {Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)}nh,nd,m∈N is vot-
ing friendly w.r.t. check, {Testm}m∈N, {Policyn,m}n,m∈N, Extract, {Count`}`∈N if it
is almost determinate, if {Testm}m∈N, {Policyn,m}n,m∈N, Extract, are voting-friendly,
and if for any set of names E0, any initial attacker knowledgeΦ0, anym,nh, nd, and any
trace (tr′·νx.phase tall.bb(RB1). . .bb(RBm), A1) of (E0, Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb), Φ0, 0), the resulting list of ballotsBB = [B1, . . . , Bm] (whereBi = RBiφ(A1))
satisfies the following properties.
1) The tally is successful (that is (νy.tal〈y〉, A2) ∈ traces(A1)) if and only if BB
passes the test and the check (Testm(BB) = > and check(BB) = >)
2) Whenever the tally produces an output (that is (νy.tal〈y〉, A2) ∈ traces(A1))
then it outputs a triple yφ(A2) = 〈res, nvotes, zkp〉 where
– res is the result computed by counting the votes once the extraction function and
the revote policy have been applied on the bulletin board;
– nvotes is the number of votes that has been counted;
– zkp is a (valid) zero-knowledge proof that would not be valid for any other list of
ballots different from BB;
– either res is the only result the tally can produce from BB (typically in the ho-
momorphic case) or the tally can produce any permutation of it (typically in the
mixnet case).
A fully formal definition can be found in the companion technical report [26]. We be-
lieve most existing protocols satisfy these requirements.
For many protocols ballots can be associated to the public credentials that were used
to cast them. This is the case for Helios and some of its variants where ballots either
contain the voter identity (in the original Helios) or are signed using private credentials
(in the Belenios system). As we will see in the next section we can get tighter bounds for
this class of protocols. Formally we define protocols with identifiable ballots as follows.
Definition 7. An e-voting protocol {Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)}nh,nd,m∈N has
identifiable ballots if for all nh, nd,m ∈ N, for any trace
(tr′·νx.phase tall.bb(RB1). . .bb(RBm)·νy.tal〈y〉, A)
of Πnh,nd,m(Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)) there exists a recipe R and a variable x such that
∀1 ≤ i ≤ m. if Extract([RBiφ(A)],Kpv,Kpb) = (V, c˜r) then Riφ(A) = pub(c˜r)
where Ri = R{x 7→ RBi}.
4 Main results
Throughout the section we consider two voting protocols
{Πnh,nd,mi (Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb)}nh,nd,m∈N
for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2 which are voting-friendly for checki, {Testm}m∈N, {Policyn,m}n,m∈N,
Extractmi , {Count`i}`∈N. Note that we assume the same public test for both protocols.
Moreover we assume that nh ≥ 2 and m ≥ nh + nd.
Let E0 be a set of names, and Φ0 a ground substitution representing the initial at-
tacker knowledge. {Anh,nd,m0 }nh,nd,m∈N and {Bnh,nd,m0 }nh,nd,m∈N are two families
of extended processes defined as follows
Anh,nd,m0
def
= (E0 ∪ Crhnh , Πnh,nd,m1 (Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb), Φ0, 0) ∀nh, nd,m ∈ N
Bnh,nd,m0
def
= (E0 ∪ Crhnh , Πnh,nd,m2 (Crhnh , Crdnd ,Kpv,Kpb), Φ0, 0) ∀nh, nd,m ∈ N
Our reduction results apply to equivalences of the form Anh,nd,m0 ≈ Bnh,nd,m0 for all
m,nh, nd. Vote privacy is typically modelled in this way [5]. The proofs of the results
presented in this section could not be included due to lack of space, but are available in
the technical report [26].
Our first result states that attacks on such equivalences require at most 3 voters.
Proposition 1. If Akh,kd,`0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`0 then A2,k
′
d,`
0 6≈ B2,k
′
d,`
0 for k
′
d = 0 or k
′
d = 1.
Note that this case does not yet bound the number of ballots to be considered. In
particular, when re-voting is allowed the attacker may a priori need to submit several
ballots in order to distinguish the two processes. In other words, the ballot box is still
parameterized by the number of ballots to be received. However, whenever we assume
that Π1 and Π2 do not allow voters to revote, we can deduce immediately that 3 ballots
suffice to capture any attack. More formally, we encode this situation by letting k = `
and considering the re-vote policy that only keeps the first vote of each voter.
Theorem 1. If {Policyn,m}n,m∈N = {Policyn,mfirst }n,m∈N and Akh,kd,k0 6≈ Bkh,kd,k0
where k = kh + kd, then A
2,k′d,k
′
0 6≈ B2,k
′
d,k
′
0 for k
′
d = 0 or k
′
d = 1 and k
′ = 2 + k′d.
Intuitively, the case where k′d = 0 corresponds to the case where an attacker can
distinguish the processes playing only with two honest voters. This case for instance
arises when analyzing a naive protocol where each voter simply signs his vote, hence
offering no anonymity at all. The case where k′d = 1 corresponds to the case where the
attacker computes a vote which depends on the honest votes. The above results state
that an attacker does not need more then one ballot in that case. An example of such
an attack is the vote copy attack on Helios described in [13]. We could actually encode
any attack with 2 voters into an attack with 3 voters by letting the adversary play like a
useless, honest, voter. This would require however to formalize the fact that the attacker
may always simulate an honest voter, that is, the voting process.
We now consider the case where re-voting is allowed. In this case we can bound the
number of ballots that need to be considered to 4+2k (for k number of voters in total).
Proposition 2. If Akh,kd,`0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`0 , then there exists `min ≤ 4 + 2k such that
Akh,kd,`min0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`min0 where k = kh + kd.
Combining the reductions on the number of voters and the number of ballots we
obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. If Akh,kd,`0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`0 , then there exists k′d ∈ {0, 1}, `min ≤ 4+2k such
that A2,k
′
d,`min
0 6≈ B2,k
′
d,`min
0 where k = 2 + k
′
d.
This is an immediate consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 and yields a bound of
4+2×3=10. When protocols have identifying ballots (Definition 7) we can tighten our
reduction of the number of ballots: we only need to consider 4 + k ballots.
Corollary 1. If Π1 and Π2 have identifying ballots and Akh,kd,`0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`0 , then
∃`min ≤ 4 + k. Akh,kd,`min0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`min0 where k = kh + kd.
This is a corollary of the proof of Proposition 2. With identifiable ballots, we know that
the ballots selected by the revoting policy on the left and on the right hand-side are the
same. Again, we combine this result with the reduction on the number of voters.
Theorem 3. IfΠ1 andΠ2 have identifying ballots andAkh,kd,`0 6≈ Bkh,kd,`0 then ∃k′d ∈
{0, 1}, `min ≤ 4 + k such that A2,k
′
d,`min
0 6≈ B2,k
′
d,`min
0 where k = 2 + k
′
d.
This follows from Corollary 1 and Proposition 1 and yields a bound of 4+3=7 ballots.
5 Case studies
We apply our results on several case studies: several versions of Helios [18, 19, 28]
and Preˆt-a`-Voter [20], as well as the JCJ protocol [29] implemented in the Civitas sys-
tem [30]. For some of these protocols we show that the ProVerif verification tool [1] can
be used to perform a security proof that, thanks to our results, is valid for an arbitrary
number of voters and ballots.
For the other protocols, ProVerif is not able to verify the protocols, either due to the
fact that equational theories with AC symbols are not supported by ProVerif or simply
because of a state explosion problem. In these cases we show that our results never-
theless apply. Given recent progress in automated verification for equivalence proper-
ties [9,10,31] we hope that verification of some of these protocols will be possible soon.
Our results would also be useful to simplify proofs by hand.
The results in this section are summarized in Figure 2. Our hypotheses were always
satisfied wherever applicable. For several protocols, we could not conduct the analysis
with ProVerif, either because the equational theory is out of reach of the tool or because
we had to stop ProVerif execution after a couple of hours. The case studies are further
detailed in the companion report [26]. The results in this section rely on ProVerif scripts
available at http://3voters.gforge.inria.fr.
3 ballots
(Theorem 1)
Hyp ProVerif
PaV (DM) X X
PaV (RM) X ×
Helios mix (weeding) X X
Helios mix (id in zkp) X X
Helios hom (weeding) X ×
Helios hom (id in zkp) X ×
Belenios mix X X
Belenios hom X ×
(a) Protocols without revoting.
7 ballots
(Theorem 3)
10 ballots
(Theorem 2)
Hyp ProVerif Hyp ProVerif
Helios mix (weeding) X X X ×
Helios mix (id in zkp) X X X ×
Helios hom (weeding) X × X ×
Helios hom (id in zkp) X × X ×
Belenios mix X X X ×
Belenios hom X × X ×
JCJ X × X ×
(b) Protocols with revoting.
Fig. 2. Summary of application of our results on case studies. A × in the “ProVerif” column
indicates that we could not successfully run the analysis with ProVerif.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we propose reduction results for e-voting protocols that apply to vote pri-
vacy. We believe they also apply to stronger properties such as receipt-freeness. Our
first reduction result states that whenever there is an attack, there is also an attack with
only two honest voters and at most one dishonest voter. This considerably simplifies the
proofs and encodings otherwise needed to verify such protocols using automated veri-
fication tools. We moreover consider the case where the protocol allows a voter to cast
multiple votes and selects one vote according to a given re-vote policy, e.g. select the
last vote casted. In that case verifying privacy is still complicated even when restricted
to three voters. We therefore show a second reduction result that allows to consider at
most 10 ballots. In case the protocol has identifiable ballots we reduce the number of
necessary ballots to 7. We have shown that the hypotheses of our theorems are satis-
fied by many protocols: several variants of Helios, Preˆt-a`-Voter, as well as Civitas. For
several of these protocols we were able to apply automated tool verification and pro-
vide the first automated proofs for an unbounded number of voters and ballots. For the
decryption mixnets-based PaV protocol, we even provide the first proof of vote privacy.
An interesting direction for future work is to further tighten the bound on the num-
ber of ballots, possibly characterizing properties enjoyed by voting protocols. We also
foresee to show similar reduction results for other properties of e-voting, such as veri-
fiability. Given that the result is stated in a symbolic model, we also plan to investigate
if the result can be transposed to a computational model.
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